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RETHINKING THE COSTS
OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS
DANIEL ABEBE*
ABSTRACT
A prominent criticism of United States delegations to international
institutions—or international delegations—focuses on agency costs. The
criticism draws a stark contrast between international delegations and
domestic delegations. For domestic delegations to agencies, U.S.
congressional, executive, and judicial oversight mechanisms exist to try to
ensure agency accountability. Since the agency is democratically
accountable, agency costs are low. For international delegations of
binding authority to international institutions, however, the conventional
wisdom is that oversight mechanisms are absent and the United States
cannot monitor the international institution to ensure it acts within its
delegated authority. Therefore, in the international context, agency costs
are high. The fear of high agency costs through the loss of democratic
accountability, so the argument goes, justifies constitutionally inspired
limits on international delegations.
This Article challenges the
conventional wisdom. It argues that the claim of high agency costs rests
on weak foundations because agency costs will likely vary depending on
the type, scope, and nature of the delegation; that the United States has
actually implemented many of the domestic oversight tools in the
international context, ensuring a surprisingly high level of accountability
to American interests; and that the potential costs and benefits of
international delegations may not be substantially different from those in
domestic delegations. In other words, it is unlikely that there are
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dramatic differences between domestic and international delegations with
respect to the efficacy of oversight mechanisms or the balance of costs and
benefits. This Article concludes that constitutionally-inspired limits on
binding international delegations are probably unnecessary because they
will increase the costs for the United States to participate in potentially
beneficial international cooperation.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Which is worse: a delegation to an unaccountable federal
agency or a delegation to an unaccountable international
institution? The answer is not as clear as it might seem. Today,
Congress and the President delegate effective decision-making
authority to federal entities and to international institutions.
Although most accept domestic delegations to federal entities as
part of the modern administrative state, some fear the prospect of
international delegations to distant, unaccountable, and
supposedly anti-American international institutions, and propose
strict limits on them. They claim that international delegations
pose a distinctive democratic accountability dilemma that domestic
delegations do not. To frame the problem, consider two stylized
examples.
Example One. Congress and the President have long delegated
authority to the Federal Reserve, a domestic entity, to manage the
U.S. financial system. In 2010, in response to the financial crisis,
Congress and the President empowered the Federal Reserve to
develop new regulations for banks. The Federal Reserve, through
its Board of Governors, has since issued some forty-seven
regulatory measures with neither open meetings nor public
discussion of its rule-making. Congress and the President cannot
monitor the Board of Governors’ activities, participate in the
debate, or block any rule inconsistent with their interests.
Example Two. Congress and the President have long delegated
authority to the United Nations (“U.N.”), an international
institution, to maintain international peace and security. In 2011,
in response to the Libyan uprising, Congress and the President
sought to use the U.N. as a tool to implement a plan of military
action against the Muammar Gaddafi regime. Acting through the
Security Council, the United States sponsored and obtained
successful passage of a resolution after holding open meetings and
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debate. At the same time, a non-permanent member of the
Security Council introduced a resolution condemning the actions
of a U.S. ally in the Middle East. Since the United States is a
permanent member of the Security Council and holds a veto, the
executive branch was able to monitor this effort and eventually
block the proposed resolution that was inconsistent with American
interests.
Based upon these two examples, it is unclear which species of
delegation, domestic or international, creates greater democratic
accountability problems for Congress and the President. In light of
this, it is worth considering carefully whether delegations of
authority to international institutions such as the United Nations
indeed create what are called greater “agency costs” than domestic
delegations of authority to bodies such as the Federal Reserve. The
conventional wisdom, which is critical of international delegations,
mistakenly suggests the answer is obvious: international
delegations almost always create significantly higher agency costs
than domestic delegations.
For domestic delegations, U.S.
congressional, executive and judicial oversight mechanisms are
present to monitor the agency to try to ensure accountability and
democratic legitimacy. Here, agency costs are low. But for
international delegations of binding authority to international
institutions, critics contend U.S. oversight mechanisms are absent,
leaving the United States unable to ensure that the international
institution will act within the bounds of its delegated authority.
Moreover, international institutions are neither representative of
U.S. interests nor accountable to the American public. Therefore,
agency costs are high for international delegations, and binding
international delegations should be either disfavored or avoided.1
How would critics address this apparent problem? Most want
to limit, but not entirely oust, international delegations. Some
suggest that U.S. courts should adopt “super-strong” clear
1 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-SelfExecution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); Julian G.
Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with
Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global
Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527 (2003); Edward T. Swaine, The
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1540 (2004);
John O. McGinnis, Medellín and the Future of International Delegations, 118 YALE L.J.
1712 (2009).
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statement rules or non-self-execution default rules when
considering whether the United States has made a binding
international delegation. Others suggest that the United States
should require that all binding international delegations go
through the Article II treaty process, making them much harder to
enact. In the end, the specter of high agency costs, so the argument
goes, justifies modification to constitutional processes in ways that
impose limits on international delegations.
To examine the merits of the agency costs claim, this Article
focuses on two important questions: First, are the oversight tools
used to manage international delegations and domestic delegations
systematically different in efficacy? Second, is the balance of costs
and benefits for international delegations systematically different
from that of domestic delegations? For the reasons outlined below,
I argue that the answer to both questions is likely no.
I challenge the key claim that international delegations create
high agency costs because domestic oversight mechanisms are
unavailable in the international context. To the contrary, many of
the oversight mechanisms common to domestic delegations are
already present, in different forms, for international delegations.
The economic, political, and military power of the United States
makes it uniquely well placed to influence ex ante the design and
structure of the international institutions to which it might choose
to delegate binding authority, and shape ex post the product of
those international institutions. Because of this influence, the
United States can replicate some of the domestic oversight tools—
procedural constraints, appropriations, and agenda setting, for
example—in the international context as well. Indeed, the United
States has a number of tools unique to the international
environment, ranging from side-payments and foreign aid, to
weighted voting and veto powers, to try to align the international
institutions with U.S. interests.
From this perspective,
international delegations and domestic delegations are not
categorically distinct on any democratic accountability or agency
cost metric; oversight mechanisms exist in both contexts to reduce
agency costs.
I contend that the critics are wrong to conclude that the balance
of costs and benefits from international delegations is
systematically different from the balance in the domestic
delegation context. An initial problem is that it is unclear how
critics define agency costs, measure them, and determine when

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss3/2

02_ABEBE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

8/6/2013 7:53 PM

COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

495

agency costs are high enough to justify limits on international
delegations. Agency costs, moreover, will likely vary depending
on the type of delegation, the scope of the delegation, the issue
area, and the frequency with which the international institution is
likely to exercise delegated authority, among other factors.2 Any
strong claim about the level of agency costs must, at the very least,
provide a more nuanced analysis of the interactions between the
United States and international institutions. In addition, critics do
not specify how high agency costs must be to warrant
constitutional redress. If agency costs are lower than they
assume—the claim is underspecified—then making international
delegations more difficult to enact may very well be a solution in
search of a problem. Agency costs are problematic if they
outweigh the potential benefits from binding international
delegations. The mere existence of agency costs, without greater
specification, seems insufficient to warrant specific changes in the
constitutional process solely to limit international delegations.
In fact, the President and Congress are already fully
incentivized to consider carefully the wisdom of binding
international delegations and will likely take steps to ensure
accountability and reduce agency costs without any modification
of constitutional process. This caution is reflected in the pattern of
U.S. design, control, and influence over international institutions
for non-binding international delegations and, given the United
States’ incentives to protect the American political processes, it is
even more likely that this pattern will continue for binding
international delegations. Since the United States would only
delegate binding authority in the vast majority of cases to an
international institution that it could influence, additional
constitutionally inspired limits would be superfluous.
In the end, proposals to raise the enactment costs of all binding
delegations create a crude rule of national constitutional design
that will likely limit the ability of Congress and the President to
conduct foreign affairs. A careful analysis of the costs and benefits
2 See Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2008) (describing the various types of
international delegations); Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of
International Delegation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1693 (2008) (questioning the proper
definition of international delegations and exploring the instances in which the
United States delegates authority).
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of binding international delegation will depend on international
political considerations properly within the national government’s
foreign affairs prerogatives. Since international delegations are
given effect by treaty or statute, Congress and the President clearly
participate in the enactment process, ameliorating some of the
accountability and legitimacy concerns. And of course, if a later
Congress and President conclude that a specific international
delegation is problematic, they can abrogate the delegation
through subsequent legislation without triggering offsetting
democratic costs.
This discussion suggests that agency costs in international
delegations might not systematically be higher or categorically
distinct from those in domestic delegations. The United States has
tools to reduce agency costs in both contexts. If so, the adoption of
constitutionally inspired design rules to raise the enactment costs
of all binding international delegations is unnecessary and
probably counterproductive, as such rules will limit the national
government’s flexibility to participate in and delegate to
international institutions that might create benefits for the United
States.
The Article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes domestic
and international delegations to set the framework for analysis.
Section 3 evaluates the problems with international delegations
and the proposals to raise the enactment costs of international
delegations. Section 4 argues that many of the domestic oversight
tools are available in the international context and that the United
States is particularly well situated to influence the international
institutions exercising delegated authority. The Article concludes
with a discussion of the possible benefits of binding international
delegations and suggests that constitutional limitations on
international delegations are unnecessary.
2.

DELEGATIONS: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL

2.1. Domestic Delegations
The regulatory structure governing domestic delegations to
administrative agencies provides the framework through which
scholars generally evaluate international delegations. Although
the administrative law literature on domestic delegations is
enormous and a review is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
important to sketch an outline of it to compare to international
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delegations. The comparison will shed light on the type of
problems common to domestic delegations and on the attempts to
address them, and will provide background on the critiques for
binding delegations as well.
In the United States, domestic delegations were tools borne out
of the increasingly complex and technical regulatory apparatus of
the modern administrative state.3 Congress, lacking the necessary
expertise and resources to address new regulatory demands, began
to delegate broad authority to executive agencies for them to issue
rules, directives, and regulations in their specified issue areas.4
The benefit is twofold: Congress can take advantage of agency
expertise, in theory producing socially desirable outcomes, and
Congress can focus its resources on issues for which it is bettersuited to legislate.5
Despite the potential benefits, delegations create a principalagent problem6—namely that Congress and the President7 cannot
3 This development, combined with the Supreme Court’s loosening of the
non-delegation doctrine, opened the door to the expansion of domestic
delegations. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 132–33 (1980) (concluding the non-delegation doctrine is dead); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (arguing that
although the non-delegation doctrine is no longer recognized, different canons of
construction operate as a type of non-delegation principle to oversee the
administrative state); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) (arguing there is no nondelegation doctrine as typically described and that agents acting under a statutory
grant are exercising executive, not legislative, power).
4 See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE
POWERS (1999).
5 See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23, 142 (1938);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 23 (1990); James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 363–66 (1976); see also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T.
MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10–12 (1993) (noting the conservation of
congressional resources as a benefit of delegation).
6 Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 247 (“The
problem of bureaucratic compliance has long been recognized as a principal-agent
problem. Specifically, members of Congress and the president are principals in an
agency relationship with an executive bureau.”). For further background on the
principal-agent problem, see generally Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of
Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739 (1984); Barry R. Weingast, The CongressionalBureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44
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perfectly control their agent, the domestic agencies exercising
delegated authority. After the delegation, neither Congress nor the
President can ensure that the agencies would consistently act
within the bounds of their delegated authority. The agent might
deviate from the interest of the principals, leading to legitimacy
and accountability concerns. This is an ongoing problem and the
legal and political science literatures on administrative agencies are
filled with examples of Congress and the President’s difficulties in
ensuring the accountability of agencies.8 Agencies shirk, sabotage,
develop their own agendas, and engage in other activities that
produce agency costs.9 The higher the agency costs, the greater the
concern that the agencies are operating independent of Congress
and the President’s wishes, reducing the value of the delegations
and potentially leading to bureaucratic drift.10 In light of these
problems, scholars have identified and evaluated various
monitoring and oversight mechanisms to constrain agencies and
more closely align them with the interests of the principal

PUB. CHOICE 147 (1984); Barry M. Mitnick, The Theory of Agency: The Policing
“Paradox” and Regulatory Behavior, 24 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1975).
7 The coalition in Congress that created the agency may be more directly the
principal than Congress as a whole. See McCubbin, Noll & Weingast, supra note 6,
at 255 (“[T]he coalition that forms to create an agency—the committee that drafted
the legislation, the chamber majorities that approved it, and the president who
signed it into law—will seek to ensure that the bargain struck among the
members of the coalition does not unravel once the coalition disbands.”).
8 See JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE:
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC (2002); McCubbins, Noll &
Weingast, supra note 6; Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
9 See BREHM & GATES, supra note 8; Matthew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, A
Theory of Congressional Delegation, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 409, 410–14
(Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds. 1987) (describing the problems of
agency shirking and slippage); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1282–1300 (2006)
(discussing how agency capture in the health and safety context results in
overzealous regulations and inefficiencies).
10 See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 6, at 443–44 (noting the
structure of an agency must be designed to be responsive to the constituencies the
delegation was meant to satisfy to prevent policy drift); Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111 (1992).
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(Congress or the enacting coalition in Congress).11 For my
purposes, I will simplify and treat Congress and the President as
joint principals.
One common tool of oversight for Congress and the President
is the appointment process. Since the President and Congress act
together to nominate and confirm potential appointees, they can
coordinate and “arrange for appointees who more nearly share the
political consensus on policy [as] a self-enforcing mechanism for
assuring reliable [sic] agency performance.”12 With appointees
who share a common approach serving as agency heads, the
agencies might be less likely to deviate from the interests of
Congress and the President, thereby presumably reducing agency
costs and increasing accountability.
Another tool to constrain agents is through ex ante procedural
controls.13 Federal agencies are already subject to procedural
constraints through the Administrative Procedure Act14 but the
language in the Act is general and not specifically tailored to the
different administrative agencies. The President and Congress,
however, could force agencies to adopt specific decision-making
processes, use certain methodologies,15 or engage in agenda

11 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2255–
69 (2001) (evaluating informal controls on agency action such as “fire alarms,”
reliance on experts, and interest group influence).
12 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucracy and Intergovernmental Relations, in
ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 429 (2d ed. 2010)
13 Id.
14 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (1994)).
15 President Reagan was the first executive to require the use of cost-benefit
analysis in agency decision-making. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128
(1982) (“Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society . . . .”). For a
discussion on cost-benefit analysis, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006). At times, administrative agencies
have been required to conduct a feasibility analysis, instead of a cost-benefit
analysis. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 6, Pub. L. No. 91–
596, 84 Stat. 1590, 1593 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)) (requiring the agency to
ensure “to the extent feasible” that exposure to hazards in the workplace does not
harm workers’ health). For a discussion of the merits of feasibility analysis, see
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
657 (2010).
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setting16 to narrow agency authority. Still others have suggested
that Congress and the President consider the institutional design17
of agencies to reduce agency costs by creating institutional
structures that shape the way the agencies operate and provide
greater transparency and limit agency discretion.18
Scholars have also examined the ex post tools available to
ensure that the agencies continue to function within their
delegated authority. On an ongoing basis, Congress can use
“police-patrols,”19 empower congressional committees to directly
monitor agencies, or authorize individuals, corporations, or other
parties subject to agency rule-making, to act as “fire-alarms”,20 and
report agency misbehavior back to Congress. In theory, once
Congress observes bureaucratic drift or other problems, it could
threaten to cut agency funding21 or conduct oversight hearings22 to
question and embarrass agency heads.
16 In some circumstances, the agenda setting may be broad. See, e.g., Exec.
Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (directing agencies to consider
values such as equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts). In
contrast, Congress may try to control an agency by limiting its discretion. See
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress,
Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227, 229 (1995) (“Legislators try
to control agency actions through administrative procedures, such as budgeting
authority, legislative vetoes, and limits on agency discretion.”).
17 Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1385, 1424–26 (2008) (discussing the costs and benefits of concentrating
executive power over administrative agencies).
18 See Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 339 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds.,
2010) (noting that Congress may “manipulate the structure of agencies” to
“control agency discretion”).
19 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (“[A]t
its own initiative, Congress examines a sample of executive-agency activities, with
the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by its
surveillance, discouraging such violations.”).
20 See id. (“Congress establishes a system of rules, procedures, and informal
practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine
administrative decisions . . . to charge executive agencies with violating
congressional goals . . . .”); Kagan, supra note 11, at 2258 (“A primary mechanism
of control “is a ‘fire alarm’ system” which “is a set of procedures and practices
that enable citizens and interest groups to monitor an agency and report any
perceived errors to the relevant congressional committees.”).
21 J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2217, 2235–36 (2005) (listing the potential sanctions for an agency’s failure to
fulfill its mandates).
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Similarly, the President has tools to limit agency discretion.23
The President can issue directives by Executive Order regarding
the breadth of agency authority in a particular area,24 engage in
intra-executive review of agency actions, and even informally
appropriate authority over agency function.25 The President could
threaten to terminate26 or otherwise pressure agency heads to act
within their delegated authority.
A final, weaker mechanism to control agencies and reduce
agency costs is judicial review.27 Individuals, companies, and other
parties affected by agency decisions could bring suit challenging
agency regulations in federal court, creating direct judicial
oversight of agencies.28 In theory, the ex ante prospect of ex post
Id.
See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2285–2303 (discussing President Clinton’s use
of formal directives, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review, and
personal appropriation of regulatory action to control agency discretion); Sidney
A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning
Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 583 (2011) (describing
presidents’ strategies to control agencies, including increasing the size of the
White House staff that oversees agencies, increasing the number of presidential
appointees within agencies, and imposing reporting requirements).
24 For instance, Executive Order 12,580 designated federal agencies as the
President’s response authorities under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act for facilities under their “jurisdiction
custody and control.” Exec. Order No. 12,580, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,871 (Aug. 28, 1996).
25 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 21, at 2231–33 (arguing that interagency review and coordination may control agency action); Kagan, supra note 11
(describing presidential appropriation of agency action).
26 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive from Those Who Would
Destroy and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi &
Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 597–98 (2010) (noting the president
can fire an administrator and replace her with someone who shares his views).
27 See Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The
Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 675 (1992) (arguing
judicial review controls agency capture); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of
Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 394–95 (noting judicial
review checks agencies’ ability to favor private interests).
28 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides a cause of action to
challenge “final agency action,” including temporary and permanent regulations.
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). Parties can also seek
pre-enforcement judicial review of many agency actions, including review of
regulations interpreting myriad statutes. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
153–54 (1967) (allowing for pre-enforcement injunctive and declaratory judgment
remedies concerning statutory construction). For different approaches to judicial
deference of agency regulations, see generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
22
23
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legal invalidation of agency regulations would constrain agency
behavior. But the use of courts to rein in agencies has led to a
different issue: an increase in administrative law cases filling the
docket of federal courts.29 Of course, courts lack the resources to
adjudicate all administrative law cases and evaluate agency action,
reducing their efficacy as a regulatory mechanism. If agencies
know in advance that the legal system lacks the capacity to review
agency rule-making, the threat of legal invalidation is illusory and
will not seriously constrain agencies. The resource issue, combined
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron,30 narrowed the
grounds upon which parties could challenge agency decisions and
in effect took a tool for agency review off of the table.31

Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Stephen Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986).
29 See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts
and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473,
477 (2009) (citing administrative agency appeals as accounting for nearly thirty-six
percent of cases filed in the Ninth Circuit).
30 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006)
(discussing the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework for judicial
deference to agency action applies); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (exploring the scope of the Chevron
doctrine); Adrian Vermeule & Jacob E. Gersen, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE
L.J. 676 (2007) (proposing a voting rule to determine judicial deference to agency
statutory interpretation).
31 Chevron entails a two-step approach to reviewing agency action: it first asks
whether the statute has a gap or ambiguity, and if so, whether the agency’s
interpretation of the ambiguity is reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. Later
the Court clarified that Chevron rests on the “presumption that Congress, when it
left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood
that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of
discretion the ambiguity allows.” Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735,
740–41 (1996). Numerous scholars have written on the effect of Chevron. See, e.g.,
Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1994); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical
Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(1998) (discussing the reasons for which a rational court would adopt the Chevron
doctrine and exploring changes in court behavior induced by Chevron); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051 (1995) (examining the
apparent breakdown of Chevron and its progeny).
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Despite the fact that no mechanism can fully eliminate agency
costs, domestic delegations are generally uncontroversial32
because, in theory, politically accountable actors selected through
the democratic process can generally review, monitor, or invalidate
agency decisions.33 Congress, acting with the President, delegates
decision-making authority to an agency; the President nominates
the people to staff the agency; the Senate confirms or rejects the
nominees; and the courts are open for judicial review of agency
action. In principle, each actor is representative of and responsive
to the American public, and the process generally adheres to the
Constitution’s formal requirements and structural limitations. For
domestic delegations, the benefits of agency expertise come with
agency costs, which are reduced by formal and informal review
mechanisms.
The discussion here is certainly incomplete in that it neither
provides a complete account of the entire suite of tools available to
Congress and the President, nor comprehensively examines its
efficacy. Rather, this examination seeks to provide a window into
the formal and informal mechanisms, and ex post and ex ante tools
used to constrain domestic agencies. By understanding the general
operation of these mechanisms, we can now develop a framework
to compare the domestic and international oversight mechanisms
used to reduce agency costs.

32 Some think that all delegations are invalid as a transfer of legislative
authority to the executive. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (2002).
Others seek to limit delegations or impose a higher level of judicial review on
agency actions. See, e.g., Alex Forman, Note, A Call to Restore Limitations on
Unbridled Congressional Delegations: American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 34 IND. L.
REV. 1477, 1497 (2001) (“The Supreme Court should have adopted the
nondelegation doctrine as [a] means of monitoring the regulatory power of
agencies, because it is consistent with constitutional norms as well as the
doctrine’s underlying principles.”).
33 See Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of Administration, 1987 BYU L.
REV. 927, 944 (noting how regulatory choices should be made “by officials subject
to the control of a politically accountable actor”); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS,
AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 153 (1997)
(arguing that presidential control helps ensure democratic responsiveness and
accountability).
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2.2. International Delegations
The relatively straightforward account about the costs and
benefits of domestic delegations changes, however, with respect to
international delegations. International delegations are the transfer
of executive, legislative, or adjudicative decision-making authority
to an international organization, body, agency, panel, or other
entity.34 With the significant exception of the international
component, international delegations are conceptually identical to
domestic delegations.
International delegations are either non-binding or binding.35
Non-binding international delegations assign decision-making
authority to an international body, but do not make the decisions
of that body automatically enforceable within the delegating state’s
(the principal’s) legal system.36 Consider the following modified
example of a delegation of adjudicative authority drawn from the
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).37 The United
States, Canada, and Mexico want to create a free trade zone
encompassing each country and sign a treaty to that effect. Under
the terms of the treaty, the states create an adjudicative body or
appeals panel to hear potential claims regarding the treatment of
companies operating within the free trade zone. In this example,
the United States has delegated adjudicative authority to the
international appeals panel created by the treaty to resolve claims
arising under the treaty; this transfer of authority is an
international delegation.
34 See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 2, at 2 (surveying the kinds of
international delegations); Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2, at 1697–1701
(questioning the proper definition of international delegations).
35 Bradley & Kelley, supra note 2, at 4; Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2, at
1697–1701.
36 See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 2, at 4 (concluding that international
delegations exist even when states give an international body only nonbinding
power to issue resolutions, proposals, and opinions).
37 See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 103–182, 107 Stat. 2057 (Dec. 8, 1993); American President: A Reference Resource:
Clinton Signs NAFTA—December 8, 1993, THE MILLER CTR., UNIV. OF VA. (1993),
http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/events/12_08 (last visited
May 1, 2013) (detailing the events leading up to the signing of NAFTA);
Demetrius Andreas Floudas & Luis Fernando Rojas, Some Thoughts on NAFTA and
Trade Integration in the American Continent, 52 INT’L PROB. 371, 371–72 (2000)
(summarizing NAFTA and the events leading up to the agreement).
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The appeals panel could issue judgments regarding claims
brought under the treaty but, if the delegation were non-binding,
the appeals panel’s judgments would not be immediately
enforceable or provide a rule of decision in U.S. courts. Some
political branch action (i.e., action by Congress and/or the
President) would be necessary before those judgments have legal
effect in the United States.
Non-binding international delegations are generally not the
source of the most serious constitutional concerns because some
political branch action is necessary before any decision, judgment,
or regulation becomes binding in the United States.38 In other
words, Congress and the President must act before anything
becomes enforceable in the United States. Presumably, the
constitutional problems here are minimal and the agency costs are
low, or at least similar to those of domestic delegations.
For some, the concerns about international delegations rise
dramatically when the United States transfers binding decisionmaking authority to an international entity.39 To illustrate the
point, imagine that the NAFTA appeals panel in the example
above could hear claims and its decisions would be immediately
enforceable as a rule of decision in U.S. courts. After the appeals
panel issues its judgment, Congress and the President would not
have the option of noncompliance by refusing to act. The
judgment would have immediate legal effect. For this reason,
critics argue that binding international delegations are
constitutionally problematic and exacerbate agency costs.
In addition, international delegations create formal and
structural constitutional problems.
For example, binding
38 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(3) (1986) (“[A] ‘non-self-executing’ agreement will not be given effect as law
in the absence of necessary implementation.”); Curtis A. Bradley, International
Delegations, The Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1557, 1587 (2003) (discussing non-self-executing treaties and the requirement that
Congress implement them before they override federal and state statutes that are
enforceable in U.S. courts).
39 See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 1714 (“International delegation of domestic
power [] presents a dilemma for the separation of powers in an age of
globalization.”); Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2, at 1697–1701 (considering
definitions of international delegations); Ku, supra note 1 (questioning the
constitutionality of certain transfers of power to international delegations); Yoo,
supra note 1, at 1958 (considering the constitutional limit of the application of
treaties in suits against individuals).
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international delegations of legislative authority may conflict with
Article I procedural requirements for law-making40 and
appointments.41 Typically, binding international delegations are
part of Article II treaties or congressional-executive agreements
that, by their terms, create an international body. Imagine that the
United States signs and ratifies a multilateral treaty through the
Article II treaty process (with the advice and consent of a twothirds majority of the Senate). The treaty creates an international
body that has binding authority to set minimum capital
requirements for banks. The United States, as party to the treaty,
has delegated the determination of capital requirements to an
international body. Subsequently, the body acts and determines
that all parties to the treaty must set the capital requirements for
their domestic banks at ten percent. Thus, the United States has a
binding obligation to comply with the new capital requirements.
For critics, this binding international delegation of legislative
authority permits the international body to create new “law” with
respect to capital requirements in violation of the Constitution’s
bicameralism and presentment requirements.42 The international
body’s “legislation” would be automatically enforceable as U.S.
law without further political branch action, circumventing the
House of Representatives, the Senate, and President.

40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 511 (2008)
(rejecting the proposition that decisions by the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) bind U.S. courts, finding instead that the “[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive
and Legislative—’the political’—Departments”); Natural Res. Def. Council v.
EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that if future international
environmental agreements pursuant to the Montreal Protocol are domestically
enforceable law, then serious constitutional problems are raised by the
international delegation of Congress’s law-making authority).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2–3. See John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old
Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15
CONST. COMMENT. 87–130 (1998) (discussing the constitutionality of international
delegations of power under the Appointments Clause).
42 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d at 8 (discussing the
enforceability of future agreements); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372
(1989) (“Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another
Branch.”); Ernest A. Young, supra note 1, at 529 (2003) (“[B]ecause supranational
lawmaking operates outside those systems of checks and balances and
accountability, it risks undermining our Constitution’s institutional strategy.”).
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Similarly, a binding international delegation to an international
agency would implicate the Constitution’s Appointments Clause43
and potentially Article II requirements for treaties.44 Imagine that
the United States joins a multilateral treaty that creates an
international agency with the authority to set binding regulations
for the permissible amount of carbon emissions for each state party
to the treaty. Therefore, the international agency’s director and
staff would have the authority to regulate the amount of carbon
emissions in the United States and their determination would have
immediate legal effect in the United States.45
In this example, the director and staff of the international
agency would not be appointed by the President or confirmed by
the Senate; she would be a representative of the international
agency and appointed consistent with the terms of the treaty or the
agency’s internal rules. This arrangement would seemingly violate
the Appointments Clause. Moreover, since the international
agency can make ongoing binding determinations regarding its
area of regulatory authority—in this case, carbon emissions—such
determinations could be interpreted as creating a new international
obligation for the United States. And, if it is a new international
obligation for the United States, it might require a new treaty in
conformance with the Treaty Clause.46
Perhaps the greatest concern for critics is binding delegations
of adjudicative authority to international judicial bodies.47 The
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
For a discussion of the constitutional implications of binding grants of
authority to international delegations, see Bradley, supra note 38; David M.
Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697 (2003); Ku, supra note 1, at 121; Yoo, supra
note 41; Michael J. Glennon & Allison R. Hayward, Collective Security and the
Constitution: Can the Commander in Chief Power Be Delegated to the United Nations?,
82 GEO. L.J. 1573 (1994); Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The
Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral Review Under the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455 (1992).
45 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d at 1.
46 Id. at 8 (noting that if the future agreements created under the Montreal
Protocol are law, then Congress has “authorized amendment to a treaty without
presidential signature or Senate ratification, in violation of Article II of the
Constitution”).
47 In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, petitioner argued that the United States was
obligated to comply with the Vienna Convention as interpreted by the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). 548 U.S. 331 (2006). The petitioner argued
43
44
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treaties creating the United Nations,48 NAFTA,49 and the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”),50 among others, each include a
quasi-judicial body to hear claims arising under each treaty. For
example, NAFTA’s Article 19 Arbitration Panels51 hear claims and
issue judgments. Article 19 judgments provide a rule of decision
enforceable in U.S. courts, seemingly violating Article III limits on
the delegations of judicial authority52 and the Appointments
Clause.53 The WTO’s appeals panel54 hears cases and issues
binding judgments, and the United States is party to several
arbitral or claims agreements; for example, the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal55 can issue binding decisions.
that the Supreme Court should reconsider a previous holding because the ICJ had
recently interpreted the Convention in the LaGrand and Avena cases and reached
an opposite conclusion. Id. at 333. The Supreme Court rejected this proposition,
stating the ICJ’s interpretation deserves only “respectful consideration.” Id. at
352–53. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 510 (“If ICJ judgments were instead
regarded as automatically enforceable domestic law, they would be immediately
and directly binding on state and federal courts pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause.”). For a discussion of the problems related to the delegation of binding
adjudicative authority to international bodies, see Mark L. Movsesian, Judging
International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 65 (2007); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an
International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003); McGinnis, supra note 1.
48 U.N. Charter art. 92 (designating the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations).
49 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 19, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
50 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IV,
§ 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. Notably,
the Appellate Body that hears appeals from panel reports brought by WTO
Members was established in 1995 under Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. See Dispute Settlement:
Appellate Body, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_
body_e.htm (last visited May 1, 2013).
51 NAFTA, supra note 49, art. 19.
52 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
53 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
54 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 17, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 50, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401. For examples of Appellate Body reports, see Appellate Body
Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 1, 22–
23, WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996); Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 179, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
55 The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established in the Algiers
Accords. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of
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The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),56 the legal arm of the
United Nations, can hear claims arising under the Charter and
international law generally with the consent of the state parties. In
a series of cases concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, the ICJ concluded that the United States was in violation
of the convention for failing to provide foreign nationals in police
custody with access to their respective consulates.57 Subsequently,
the Supreme Court considered whether the ICJ decisions were
“self-executing” and entitled to immediate legal effect in the
United States.58 Though the Court held that the structure of the
U.N. Charter and the absence of definitive language demonstrated
that ICJ decisions were “non-self-executing,”59 concern increased
about the ability of foreign courts to impose international law in
the United States without U.S. political-branch action.60

the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
art. IV, Jan. 19, 1981, available at General Documents: Claims Settlement Declaration 19
January 1981, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, http://www.iusct.net/General%20
Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declaration.pdf.
56 U.N. Charter art. 92; PEMMARAJU S. RAO, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
TRADE & DEV., COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT—MODULE 1.2. GENERAL TOPICS:
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at 11, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.19 (2003),
available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add19_en.pdf (listing the
types of jurisdiction the ICJ holds, including contentious jurisdiction in which the
states submit the dispute by consent for a binding decision).
57 LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶¶ 90–91 (June 27); Case
Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶
63, 76 (Mar. 31).
58 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
59 Id. at 509 (“We agree with this construction of Article 94. The Article is not
a directive to domestic courts. It does not provide that the United States ‘shall’ or
‘must’ comply with an ICJ decision, nor indicate that the Senate that ratified the
U.N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in
domestic courts.”).
60 For an overview of the debate regarding the Court’s legal reasoning in
Medellín and the future of self-execution treaty cases, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of
Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008) (criticizing Medellín’s self-execution analysis);
Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 131
(supporting the self-execution analysis). See also David H. Moore, Law(makers) of
the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 32 (2009).
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Beyond
formal
constitutional
requirements,
binding
international delegations implicate general federalism61 and
separation of powers62 concerns. Federalism63 envisions certain
limits on the national government that will be lost if international
institutions can make decisions, issue regulatory directives or
resolve legal claims that are binding in the United States.64 And
even if the President can represent U.S. interests at the
international institutions—perhaps addressing some accountability
concerns—the transfer of decision-making authority away from
Congress and the states to the President encourages a
consolidation of power in the executive branch.65 For critics,
binding international delegations conflict with the Constitution’s

61 See Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 71
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 100–06 (2008) (discussing the ways in which
international delegations may either promote or undermine federalism).
62 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 272 (2d ed. 1996); Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and
Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal
Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331 (1998); Ku, supra note 1, at 121;
Yoo, supra note 41.
63 Cf. Siegel, supra note 61, at 96–99 (“A federal system entails a vertical
division of regulatory authority between the national government and
subnational states. . . . [A] powerful check on the abuse of government power is
said to exist when multiple levels of government compete for regulatory authority
and political power is diffused.”).
64 See id. at 101 (“Turning to the other federalism values discussed above,
international delegations likely undermine all of them to the extent that such
delegations reduce state regulatory control, as opposed to leaving state control
unchanged and just reducing national control.”). See also Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998).
65 Golove has described the concerns of some scholars that international
delegations are antidemocratic and lack the necessary accountability to the
American people. Golove, supra note 44, at 1699–1700. Cf. Edward T. Swaine, The
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1540 (2004)
(noting that although the United States retains a veto on the U.N. security council,
that power is held by the executive branch officials and “Congress still loses
control”); Bradley, supra note 38, at 1559–60 (“Most typically, these transfers may
increase the relative power of the executive branch, both because they often
delegate the powers of other branches, and because the United States is
represented in these institutions by executive branch agents.”). But cf. Ku, supra
note 1 (arguing that courts should apply formalist principles to see whether
international delegations are constitutional because formalism, rather than
functionalism, ensures accountability).
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formal limits66 and traditional separation of powers and federalism
concerns.
The failure to conform to formal and structural constitutional
limitations produces a second and perhaps larger problem with
binding international delegations—a lack of democratic legitimacy
and political accountability for those entities exercising delegated
authority.67
For critics, international institutions are not
exclusively or even predominantly accountable or responsive to
the American interests.68 They are only accountable to the states
that created them—the United States and the dozens of other
member states (the joint principals) that comprise the international
institution’s membership.
In the domestic context, at least
Congress, the President, and the courts can proscribe delegations
to administrative agencies, and monitor their behavior. In the
international context, this oversight structure cannot be replicated.
Thus, agency costs are low (or lower) in domestic delegations and
higher in international delegations. In effect, delegations to
domestic agencies are the ideal type: they are constrained by a
United States principal subject to the American political process.
Whatever problems with agency costs exist in the domestic
context, they pale in comparison to the costs created by delegating
binding authority to an international institution.
66 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (endowing the President, “by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate,” with authority to make treaties and appoint
ambassadors and officers of the United States); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3
(establishing that every bill, order, resolution, or vote passed by the House and
Senate, before becoming a law or being given effect, must be presented to the
President and subjected to re-approval by Congress in the event that the President
vetoes). Article I of the Constitution also provides for bicameralism.
67 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 26 (2005) (“In our view, international lawyers can no
longer credibly argue that there are no real democracy or legitimacy deficits in
global administrative governance . . . .“); Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane,
Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 37
(2005) (conceding there is a lack of democratic accountability of international
bodies). Cf. Bradley, supra note 38, at 1558 (noting the lack of transparency in
international decision-making may increase accountability concerns).
68 See Swaine, supra note 65, at 1601–02 (“International delegations give
power to officials and institutions that ‘are not accountable, directly or indirectly,
exclusively to the American electorate,’ and indeed may not be accountable to
much of anyone at all.”); Ku, supra note 1, at 125 (concluding it is the
characteristics of evolving international organization that make them
unaccountable entities within the United States).
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Given the apparent constitutional concerns and high agency
costs, what should be done? Since the United States continues to
delegate both non-binding and binding authority to international
institutions, scholars have focused on the ex ante national
constitutional design mechanisms to regulate all international
delegations and limit binding international delegations. The next
Section examines those proposals.
3.

CRITIQUING PROPOSALS TO LIMIT INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS
3.1. Raising the Enactment Costs of Binding International Delegations

The combination of formal constitutional concerns and high
agency costs has motivated proposals to make binding
international delegations more difficult and, as a consequence,
infrequent. How do critics purport to solve the problems created
by binding international delegations? Three proposals are of
particular prominence.69 They either endorse the adoption of
interpretive tools to effectively create a non-self execution default
rule for all treaties and congressional-executive agreements that
make international delegations or, alternatively, create a process
rule to force all binding international delegations to go through the
Article II treaty process.
One proposal suggests that courts should adopt a default rule
of non-self-execution for all international delegations that purport
to create a commitment or obligation for the United States.70 Thus,
if the Unites States wants to create a binding legal obligation,
Congress and the President must specifically indicate the intent to
bind the United States in the congressional-executive agreement or
treaty that purports to make the international delegation. The
proposal rests on both formal constitutional grounds outlined in
Section 2. Another justification rests on additional consequentialist
69 A fourth proposal draws from the administrative structure of domestic
delegations and endorses the creation of an Administrative Procedure Act for
foreign affairs delegations to limit the President’s discretion. See Oona A.
Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE
L.J. 140, 219-24, 239–41 (2009) (proposing administrative law principles for a
portion of international law issues and limitations of broad foreign affairs
delegations to the executive).
70 See John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2254–57 (1999) (arguing for a
rule in which treaties are not self-executing unless lawmakers explicitly state so).
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concerns, namely that “[i]nternational delegations, by potentially
binding the United States ex ante to rules and decisions it has not
specifically approved, may in fact reduce the case-by-case
flexibility often thought important in foreign affairs.”71 Binding
international delegations are constitutionally infirm, create
accountability problems, and constrain the United States in
international politics.
A similar proposal suggests that the United States adopt a
“super-strong clear statement rule,”72 presumably requiring
Congress and the President to explicitly state their intent to bind
the United States through an international delegation of
adjudicatory authority.73 In the absence of a “super-strong” clear
statement, courts would treat judgments of international legal
tribunals as non-self executing and would not create any binding
legal obligation in the United States. Though it is not entirely
obvious how courts would distinguish between a clear statement
rule and a “super-strong clear statement rule,”74 this proposal is
designed to make binding international delegations of adjudicative
authority significantly more difficult and limit the binding effect of
judgments from international judicial tribunals.
A third option proposes to “raise the costs of enacting”75
binding international delegations by requiring that such
delegations be made only through the Article II treaty process.76
The Treaty Clause’s supermajority requirement would have the
effect of prohibiting binding international delegations through
congressional-executive agreements (which, like domestic
Bradley, supra note 38, at 1585.
Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81
WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006).
73 Id.
74 Ku argues a super-strong clear statement could come from implementing
legislation or in the language of the treaty itself. He notes the Optional Protocol to
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not contain a sufficiently clear
statement, which states “[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application
of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. . . .” Under Ku’s analysis a super-strong clear statement might
discuss the mechanisms of domestic enforcement or specific standards for U.S.
courts to follow when enforcing international judgments, but it is unclear exactly
when a clear statement becomes a super-strong clear statement. Id. at 62–63.
75 McGinnis, supra note 1, at 1715.
76 Id. at 1742.
71
72
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legislation, go through both houses of Congress and are signed by
the President) and through presidential-executive agreements
(which are negotiated and signed by the President without
congressional involvement).77 Among other things, the proposal is
framed as a compromise between a permissive regime78 that allows
binding international delegations without additional limitations
and a prohibitory regime79 that restricts them outright. Though
they vary slightly, each of these proposals represents a
constitutionally inspired limit to binding international delegations.
Most important, the proposals are concerned with the same
problems, namely a lack of formal adherence to constitutional
limitations and structural requirements, combined with the high
agency costs from poor accountability and legitimacy.
At this point, one might note a tension between the formalist
limitations endorsed by critics of international delegations and
functionalist justifications invoked in this Article. Critics are
concerned with lack of conformance with constitutional
requirements that will result in high agency costs, while this
Article focuses on the reduction of agency costs through oversight
mechanisms. But despite the critics’ contention that binding
international delegations are inconsistent with the Constitution,
none of the proposals fully embraces the formalism that they
espouse and prohibits all binding international delegations.
Rather, they explicitly attempt to limit binding international
delegations on functionalist grounds, namely concerns about
agency costs. Thus, despite the formalist concerns outlined above,
the debate really centers on whether or not the potential for high
agency costs justifies limitations on binding international
delegations, and this Article attempts to answer that question.
Since the United States has and will continue to delegate
authority to international institutions, and there is no obvious
reason to think that this trend will stop, international delegations
will likely remain a tool for the United States and the international
community to deal with challenges of global concern. If this
77 Id. at 1747 (“Because it is the treaty power that uniquely authorizes
international delegations, a congressional-executive agreement would not be
sufficient.”).
78 Id. at 1736 (describing the categorical permission model).
79 Id.
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characterization of the future of international delegations is
accurate, is there an alternative basis for limiting international
delegations? Each of the proposals outlined above argues that
binding international delegations create serious problems related
to democratic deficit, legitimacy, or accountability; in other words,
they create high agency costs. And, according to some scholars,
these costs are high enough to warrant some limit on binding
delegations. Given this link, it is important to evaluate the agency
costs claim.
3.2. Specification of Agency Costs
Critics of binding international delegations implicitly evaluate
these delegations through the same lens that they apply to
domestic delegations: they look to formal constitutional
requirements and the agency costs from lack of political
accountability. Since the oversight mechanisms available in
domestic delegations to agencies are unavailable for international
delegations to unaccountable international institutions, the critics
argue that additional procedural constraints are necessary to make
it harder for the United States to delegate binding authority.
The key justification for limits on international delegations is
the presence of high agency costs. However, the lack of specificity
in the claim regarding agency costs and lack of clarity regarding
assumptions about the incentives of international institutions
create doubt about the need for limits on binding international
delegations. Let’s begin with a consideration of agency costs.
3.2.1. Defining and Measuring High Agency Costs
The literature is not always clear about the empirical or
normative baseline to determine what constitutes high agency
costs. The common criticisms in the literature make comparative
claims about the nature of agency costs in domestic and
international delegations and conclude that the increase in scale in
the international context necessarily means high agency costs.80
80 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 1, at 1714 (“[D]elegations raise dramatic
problems of agency costs, because international agents’ work is less transparent
and less subject to control than domestic agents’ work.”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82
Tex. L. Rev. 1989, 2002 (2004) (“In the case of domestic delegations—even those
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But even with a comparative claim, we still need more guidance
about the agency cost “threshold” that international delegations
must cross to warrant the significant constitutional limits that
critics endorse. Even if we assume that critics are most concerned
about agency costs in the comparative context, we would expect
agency costs to vary according to the nature of the international
delegation (legislative, judicial, or regulatory);81 the organizational
structure of the body exercising decision-making authority;82 the
issue over which the organization has authority,83 and the scope of
domestic interference. But we would also expect the same thing in
domestic delegations. Agency costs likely vary with respect to the
type, scope, and issue area of the domestic delegation; and the
institutional design, internal procedures, and decision-making
processes of domestic agencies.
To even begin a serious
comparison of agency costs in the domestic and international
context would require some consideration of these factors, among
many others.
Moreover, it is not clear why agency costs are necessarily
always higher in international delegations than domestic
delegations. Consider this simple example. The United States
signs a multilateral treaty with three small countries creating limits
that license a fair degree of autonomy for administrative agencies—there are
significant checks on agency behavior in the form of appropriations, oversight,
amending legislation, and publicity. These checks are obviously weaker at the
international level-particularly the ability of the United States to overturn
decisions of transnational bodies, which would require the amendment of a
treaty.”).
81 See Siegel, supra note 61, at 95 (noting that the implications of international
delegations vary based on whether the delegation merely transfers a regulatory
power that would otherwise be exercised by the federal government or if the
international delegation creates legislation that would not otherwise be
promulgated by the federal government); Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H.
Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade
Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 257 (2008) (noting the surprising amount
of judicial lawmaking that has occurred under the WTO when the same action
would face domestic resistance).
82 See Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?,
71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 174–77 (2008) (noting that the design of a treaty or
organization will influence the degree to which states’ choose to delegate).
83 See Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 141–45 (2008) (arguing that international delegations
of authority on a variety of issues create significant benefits that cannot be
achieved absent delegation).
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on the expropriation of foreign property. The treaty creates an
eleven judge “International Expropriation Court” (“IEC”) with
binding adjudicative authority to hear claims and issue final
judgments; it is a binding international delegation by the United
States to the IEC through a treaty. Agency costs, in theory, might
be high since the United States cannot control the IEC’s judgments,
as they would be automatically enforceable in U.S. courts.
However, let us assume further that the treaty requires that the
IEC operate by majority vote for all decisions but permits the
United States to appoint six of the eleven judges. With this
majority, the United States would certainly have strong influence
over how the IEC will dispose of all claims, including those
relating to American interests. Here, agency costs are low because
the IEC’s voting structure effectively ensures that it would reflect
U.S. interests. The purpose of this example is to show that agency
costs are difficult to assess and that a simple “international versus
domestic” distinction might not be determinative.
In fact,
depending on the agency, the agency costs in a domestic
delegation might very well be higher than a binding international
delegation of adjudicative authority.
Moreover, it is not obvious who critics think the principal is
for purposes of international delegations.84 At the highest level of
generality, the principal might be the American people and the
claim would be that the international organization is unlikely to be
responsive to its collective will. However, it is Congress, not the
American people, which delegates authority. Congress, therefore,
could be the principal. But, when Congress acts, it is reflecting the
view of the enacting coalition, along with the President, for the
treaty or congressional agreement that creates the specific
international delegation. Without greater specification of the
principal, it is hard to assess the agency cost claim in the
international context.
Finally, critics do not explain why they think that international
institutions would be more vulnerable than domestic agencies to
agency costs stemming from agency drift,85 coalition drift,86 or
84 See note 7, supra (describing the lack of clarity on who exactly constitutes
the principal in the domestic setting—Congress as a whole or the individual
committees).
85 Cf. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy,
supra note 8, at 440–44 (exploring potential structural and process limitations that,
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interest group capture,87 creating high agency costs. Of course, the
United States might delegate binding authority to an international
institution today that, over time, might expand the scope of its
authority beyond the initial delegation, become beholden to
interest groups, or develop interests separate and independent
from the states which create it. These are certainly legitimate
concerns, but it is unclear why the agency costs that these issues
generate are significantly higher in the international context than in
the domestic context.
3.2.2. Incentives of International Institutions
The problems with under-specification also exist with respect
to the characterization of international institutions exercising
delegated authority. The literature is unclear about the basis for
assumptions about the structure and strategic incentives of
international institutions.
Though scholars do not always
explicitly state their assumptions about international institutions
and their relationship to the United States, these assumptions drive
much of the concern about agency costs.
As an initial matter, it is difficult to know ex ante with any
certainty the likely structure, procedural rules, and decisionmaking processes of the international institutions that might
exercise binding authority. The issue, type, and scope of the
delegation have consequences for the internal structure of the
international institution, making general claims more speculative.
Despite these problems, a few assumptions about the operation of
international institutions seem to motivate the criticism of
international delegations.
One clear assumption is that international institutions are
staffed with cosmopolitan foreign elites who are either dismissive

through agency design, can minimize agency drift or deviation away from the
intended policies of the coalition creating the agency).
86 See Shepsle, supra note 10, at 114–15 (observing that coalitional drift—
changes in legislative or presidential preferences resulting from elections or the
shifting winds of public opinion—moderates interest group expectations).
87 See Macey, supra note 27, at 687–92, 702–03 (concluding that the Supreme
Court’s “liberal rules of standing for structurally disenfranchised groups” are part
of the independent judiciary’s response to the problem of interest group capture
of administrative agencies).
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of or openly hostile to American interests.88 These elites will
naturally reflect the interests of their respective states, and, so the
argument goes, their interests will clash with American priorities.
In principal-agent terms, there are many joint principals with
conflicting preferences.
The international institution is an
aggregation of people who, on average, will not have American
interests in mind. Since these foreign elites will be exercising
binding decision-making authority, the agency costs of
international delegations are high.
A variant of this assumption is that international institutions
(and international law) are tools to constrain American power,
making them unlikely to represent American interests.89 Since the
United States has a predominant role in international politics, other
states cannot compete directly through traditional economic,
political, or military means. Instead, such states seek to enmesh
the United States in a web of international organizations, tribunals,
and agencies in order to limit the United States’ ability to dominate
world affairs.90 If the United States transfers binding authority to
international institutions that operate as tools for weaker states to
constrain the United States, the agency costs are, by definition,
likely to be high.
While it is certainly true that international institutions will not
perfectly reflect U.S. interests and that weaker states might try and
use institutions to constrain the United States, it also clear that the
United States has been the leading force in the conception, creation,
and use of international institutions across a number of issue
areas.91 The most salient international institutions in world
88 See, e.g., John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal
Court from America’s Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 173 (2001) (“[O]ur
main concern should be for our country’s top civilian and military leaders, those
responsible for our defense and foreign policy. They are the real potential targets
of the ICC’s politically unaccountable prosecutor.”).
89 See ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE
NEW WORLD ORDER 39–40 (2003) (“It is also understandable that Europeans should
fear American unilateralism and seek to constrain it as best they can through such
institutions as the United Nations. Those who cannot act unilaterally themselves
naturally want to have a mechanism for controlling those who can.”).
90 Id. at 40 (citing the example of the U.N. Security Council as a
“multilateralising” organization substituting for the power that weak states lack
individually to counterbalance U.S. hegemony).
91 See JOHN ALLPHIN MOORE, JR. & JERRY PUBANTZ, THE NEW UNITED NATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 43–51 (2005)
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affairs—the United Nations and the World Trade Organization—
are both the products of U.S. efforts to shape the world consistent
with American interests and, arguably, those of the international
community. In fact, for reasons discussed earlier, the United States
is unlikely to ever delegate binding decision-making authority to
international institutions that it cannot influence or control. Rather
than being constrained by international institutions, the United
States generally delegates to those international institutions that it
created and over which it exercises disproportionate influence. To
put it bluntly, the United States is likely to be the dominant
principal of an agent that it designed and over which, for the most
part, it exercises significant control.
3.3. The Potential Benefits of Binding International Delegations
The critical literature on binding international delegations
focuses almost exclusively on the agency costs problem but does
not always weigh those costs against the benefits of international
delegations.92 In fact, critics generally offer only passing reference
to the potential benefits, if at all, of greater international
cooperation.
But any analysis of the virtues of binding
international delegations would have to consider both sides of the
ledger—costs and benefits—in order to support any claim that the
agency costs are sufficient to warrant restricting delegations.
Rather than engaging in this analysis, the literature essentially
provides a one-sided, agency cost-driven analysis.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a
comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits of international
delegations, it is uncontroversial to suggest that there are global
challenges that can only be addressed through international
cooperation, and that international delegations may be one way to
exploit the organizational advantages of centralized international
institutions. Some international issues have clear spillover effects
that can be most effectively addressed on the international level.
For example, the recent (and ongoing) world financial crisis
(demonstrating, for instance, that President Roosevelt played a vital role in the
formation of the United Nations and even saw it as the crowning achievement of
his political career).
92 See Hathaway, supra note 83, at 116, 141 (encouraging scholars to consider
the benefits of international delegations, not only the costs).
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increased calls for greater harmonization of financial and economic
regulation;93 the climate change threat has led to numerous
attempts by the international community to expand the Kyoto
Protocol94 and reduce carbon emissions;95 and the attacks of
September 11 in the United States and bombings in the United
Kingdom and Spain have resulted in greater cooperation in
combating international terrorism, its funding, and organization.96
This list is not nearly comprehensive, but it suggests that any
93 See, e.g., James G. Neuger, EU Pushes for More Global Finance Rules in
Challenge to Obama, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2008, 8:27 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5gzUenHiqKM&refer=Europe
(reporting that, in light of the 2008 credit crisis, “[t]he EU will seek more powers
for the International Monetary Fund, call for stiffer regulation of credit-rating
agencies and hedge funds, and urge a crackdown on risk-taking and bankers’
pay”; while the Danish prime minister called for “better international regulation
of the capital markets, . . . more transparency, . . . common rules concerning
control and supervision, [and] common rules concerning accounting standards”);
see also Merkel Says Crisis Chance for Tough Financial Rules, REUTERS, (Dec. 30,
2008, 11:26 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/12/30/uk-germany-merkelidUKTRE4BT5IZ20081230 (“[German Chancellor Angela] Merkel, who has
indirectly criticised the United States and Britain for thwarting earlier efforts to
tighten controls and introduce more transparency, said she would press for
international organizations to clamp down.”); David Lawder & Lisa Lambert, U.S.
Must Lead World to Tougher Regulation: Summers, REUTERS, (Mar. 13, 2009, 5:48
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/13/us-financial-summers-idUST
RE52C3UY20090313 (“Top White House economic adviser Lawrence Summers . . .
called for the United States to lead a global effort to boost regulatory standards
and warned against allowing regulators to compete with one other.”).
94 Krittivas Mukherjee & Alister Doyle, World Leaders Try to Save Troubled
Climate Talks, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2009, 6:46 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/
2009/12/16/idINIndia-44776420091216 (describing slow-going efforts to update
and renew the climate regime, with governments attempting to negotiate “a deal
to transform global economies by putting greater curbs on planet-warming
greenhouse gas emissions, mainly from burning fossil fuels, from 2013 after
Kyoto’s first phase ends”).
95 Since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
entered into force, parties to the agreement have met annually in Conferences of
the Parties (COP) to discuss how to deal with climate change. During the 1990s,
the COP began to negotiate legal obligations for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. Carbon emissions goals have been raised at numerous conferences
including Copenhagen in 2009 and Durban in 2011. See, e.g., Meetings: Durban
Climate Change Conference—November/December 2011, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE http://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_
2011/meeting/6245.php (last visited May 1, 2013).
96 United Nations General Assembly Adopts Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
UNITED NATIONS ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM, http://www.un.org/en/
terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml (last visited May 1, 2013).
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determination of agency costs must be weighed against how the
benefits of successful coordination on these issues, and many
others, might redound to the United States.
Similar to domestic agencies in the United States, international
institutions can take advantage of the aggregation of human
expertise, broader access to data, greater legitimacy, and the
accumulation of institutional knowledge built up over time to
address the issues of global concern.97 International institutions
with standing committees, bodies, or executive structures can act
more rapidly to address global issues as they occur, rather than
wait for states to coordinate or to act independently in a crisis.
These actions are mostly done at a lower cost through an
international institution with decision-making authority rather
than by state coordination on a bilateral or multilateral basis; on an
issue-by-issue basis; or in a reactive, ad hoc manner. Limits on the
national government’s ability to delegate binding authority might
make it harder for the United States to enjoy the gains of
international cooperation in the situation where the gains might
outweigh the potential agency costs.
The general or long-term benefits for the United States to have
the flexibility of delegating binding authority to international
institutions—without
procedural
constraints—are
more
speculative, but important. International relations scholars differ
on the value of international institutions.98 Some think that
97 See generally Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik,
Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1 (2009) (arguing that
multilateral institutions can enhance the quality of national democratic processes,
even in well-functioning democracies).
98 For example, social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and
institutionalism all provide different understandings of the role of international
institutions. Social constructivists argue that transnational litigation promotes the
internalization of international legal norms in the domestic setting and influences
how governments conduct international relations. See Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 199 (1996) (arguing that
transnational litigation aids in the process where “international legal norms seep
into, are internalized, and become entrenched in domestic legal and political
processes”). Democratic peace theory posits that regime type—liberal or
nonliberal—determines a State’s compliance with international law. See AnneMarie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503,
528–34 (1995) (outlining the differences between liberal and non-liberal regimes in
inter-governmental agreements). Institutionalism argues that institutions reduce
information asymmetries and uncertainty, and, as a result, facilitate cooperation
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international institutions have an independent effect on state
behavior and are therefore capable of shaping state interests,99
while others find them as tools of the states that created them.100 In
the absence of a clear answer on this issue, it is unwise to create
national constitutional-design rules that limit the ability of the
United States to delegate to international institutions and narrow
the United States’ foreign affairs options.
For example, one prominent theory suggests that after conflict,
the United States has historically designed international
institutions with the goal of locking-in an existing legal or
“constitutional” order of international governance—one that
reflects the economic, political, and national security interests of
the United States—in advance of their inevitable decline in power
relative to other states.101 By creating the rules of international
politics when it is a hegemon, the United States is effectively
“hedging” against future changes in the distribution of power in
international politics. For example, after World War II, the United
States created the U.N., the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”),
and the World Bank, presumably at the peak of its relative power
with the hope that, as Europe and Asia were rebuilding in the midtwentieth century, they would enter an existing structure of
international governance. This structure would deter challenges to
the U.S.-crafted political, economic, and military order.

among States. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 94 (1984).
99 See, e.g., HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (1977); MARTHA
FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); ALEXANDER
WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999).
100 See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001)
(developing a theory of structural realism to explain state behavior and the
pursuit of power among the most powerful states in the international system);
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE (6th ed. 1985) (examining a realist approach to international law that
analyzes foreign policy and international politics as being driven by interests in
power); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979)
(developing a balance of power theory of international relations that focuses on
the structure of the international system).
101 See generally G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC
RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS (2001) (arguing that
the United States has tried to develop a constitutional post-war order through the
use of international law and international organizations).
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Now, with the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other
developing countries, the United States’ incentives to hedge or
lock-in the existing order, which it still dominates, might be
stronger. Though certainly speculative and contested, it is at least
plausible that the United States could use international institutions
as a tool to try to contain rising countries in a multilateral web of
international governance, and maintain its influence on
international politics, even as its economic and military power
recede. If this proposition is accurate, then raising the costs of
enacting international delegations might be counter-productive.
The point of this discussion is not to endorse any long-term
strategy to use international delegations and international
institutions for United States foreign policy purposes. Rather, it
shows that the benefits of international delegations—both with
respect to specific issues of global concern and broader U.S. foreign
policy goals—might outweigh the agency costs associated with
them. At the very least, claims that high agency costs justify
making binding international delegations more difficult requires a
deeper evaluation of their potential benefits.
4.

TOOLS FROM DOMESTIC DELEGATIONS AVAILABLE FOR
INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

This Article argues that many of the oversight tools for
domestic delegations are available and used in the international
context, a point frequently ignored by critics of international
delegations. What are the domestic tools? And are they available
and effective for the United States for international delegations?
This Section outlines those tools and their international analogs.
The analysis suggests that agency costs in international delegations
may not be as high as critics assume and do not justify raising the
enactment costs of such delegations. It also outlines some of the
oversight tools unique to the international environment.
As discussed in Section 2, the ex ante domestic oversight
mechanisms include the appointments process. In this process,
Congress and the President can designate loyal agency heads to
ensure that the agency acts within their delegated authority. Using
procedural constraints on the agency can also achieve this goal,
including requiring the use of specific decision-making
methodologies or explicit agenda setting. Still others focus on
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institutional design to limit discretion and constrain the agencies,
or requirements to use specific decision-making methodologies.
After the agency begins exercising decision-making authority,
Congress can use its appropriations power to limit the capacity of
the agency to act, it can provide for greater judicial review of
agency rule-making, and, perhaps most importantly, it can, in
theory, set up committees to monitor agency activities through
police patrols and fire alarms. Finally, the President can narrow
agency discretion through explicit directives, intra-executive
supervision, and the assumption of responsibility for agency
actions. Though imperfect, these tools permit the principal to
reduce agency slack and limit shirking and self-dealing by the
agent.
Many of these ex ante and ex post tools are present, in slightly
different forms, in the international context. Of course, the
argument here is not that the international oversight tools perfectly
mimic those tools in the domestic context, making agency costs
exactly the same. Rather, the argument is that any claim that
agency costs are sufficiently high to warrant constitutional redress
fails without a closer examination of the various tools that the
United States uses to influence international institutions.
Understanding the full set of options available to mitigate agency
costs also requires an examination of both ex ante and ex post tools,
something that critics underplay in concluding that international
delegations are problematic.
Some might argue that even if agency costs in international
delegations are high, the number of international delegations by
states that include actual binding authority is small,102 ameliorating
any concerns. But this argument misses two key points. First, it is
clear that the most pressing problems of global concern require
international cooperation. It is also clear that states have turned to
international institutions as the entity to aggregate information,
facilitate decision-making, and implement solutions.
This
expectation is the story of the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first
102 See Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2, at 1695–96 (noting there are only
two significant delegations of authority to international institutions by states—the
United Nations Security Council and the European Union). Though Guzman and
Landsidle are correct that international delegations of the binding variety do not
comprise the majority of delegations, the prospect of such delegations is likely to
grow over time, making an analysis worthwhile.
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centuries and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the United States has been
the chief protagonist. For better or worse, states are likely to
continue to delegate authority to international institutions. If this
premise is correct, it is important to focus on the United States and
the oversight mechanisms that might exist to reduce agency costs
in international delegations. This Article, in contrast to the extant
critical literature on international delegations, looks to U.S.
domestic delegations to better understand the monitoring and
oversight tools available. By engaging in this analysis, it is easier
to evaluate the implications of international delegations for U.S.
domestic law and the logic of constitutionally-inspired limitations.
Second, as a practical matter, some international delegations
might be important even if they are not binding. For example, we
can imagine logrolling within an international institution. The
United States might be willing to support initiatives that it does not
like in exchange for support on issues that are particularly
important.
And since international institutions reduce the
transactions costs related to international cooperation, the United
States will naturally accept some limits on its ability to act
unilaterally on an issue in order to ensure that other states “buyin” to the broader structure of the international institution, one that
over time and across the majority of issues generally reflects U.S.
interests. Even if the United States has substantial control of an
international institution, one can still imagine situations in which
the United States loses the battle on a specific initiative in order to
win the war of keeping states committed to an organizational
structure that the United States created. Thus, the international
delegation can have consequences for the United States, making a
deeper understanding of the oversight tools a particularly
important inquiry.
Of course, it is hard to predict, ex ante, the specific structure of
the international institution that would exercise binding decisionmaking authority.103 It is thus difficult to make definitive claims
103 CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 554-55
(4th ed. 2011) (emphasizing, for instance, that the United States ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention subject to twenty-eight conditions, including the
condition that the President has the power to refuse an inspection and that
Congress has a right to make reservations). See also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification
of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341,
346–48 (1995) (“The United States has been declaring the human rights
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about the presence of high agency costs in binding international
delegations or the need to limit them. But we can get traction on
these questions by looking at the current structure of international
institutions to which the United States has delegated non-binding
authority and draw inferences about the possible structure of
institutions that might exercise binding authority.
If those
international institutions exercising non-binding authority have
internal structures that provide the United States with significant
influence and control—and keep agency costs down—we can
imagine how the United States would structure the international
institutions to which it might delegate binding authority. Since the
stakes are higher in the latter context, the United States is even
more likely to ensure that the international institution is
accountable to American interests. This becomes clear when
viewing how the United States exercises its political, military, and
economic influence to shape the design and internal operation of
international institutions. Broadly speaking, the United States has
the unique capacity to influence the activities of international
organizations and ensure greater accountability than the critics of
international delegations generally assume. The United States, for
all intents and purposes, is the dominant principal in the world’s
most important international institutions. The list below describes
a few of the tools available to the United States.
4.1. Ex Ante Oversight Tools for International Delegations
As you might imagine, the claims about the ability of the
United States to use ex ante tools derives from theories of
international relations and their predictions regarding
international institutions: who creates the institutions, how they
operate, and how they enforce their policies, rules or decisions.
International institutions are generally conceived, designed and
operated by powerful states to allow them to coordinate and

agreements it has ratified to be non-self-executing.”). The International Labour
Organization also issues nonbinding guidelines for labor standards in addition to
conventions that may be ratified by member states.
Conventions and
Recommendations, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (2012), http://www.ilo.org/global/
standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-andrecommendations/lang--en/index.htm (last visited May 1, 2013).
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achieve shared goals.104 At the same time, the international
relations literature on rational constitutional design also generates
hypotheses about structuring international institutions to meet
certain goals, to increase flexibility, and even to shape state
interests.105 If such options exist, the claim is less convincing that
the difference in agency costs between international and domestic
delegations, by itself, justifies disparate constitutional treatment.
In the end, the capacity of the United States to influence the
international institution will depend on the nature of the
delegation; the decision-making procedures of the institution; the
substantive area (pollution, chemical weapons, human rights); and
the precision of the rule adopted106 (hard law or soft law). The
purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate that many of the
oversight mechanisms in domestic delegations are also available to
the United States in the international context. So what are the tools
that the United States, as the principal, can use to reduce agency
slack?
The most effective ex ante tools center on institutional design
and procedures, namely agenda setting, attenuated delegation,
voting rules (weighted voting and veto powers), appointments,
and funding. The United States has been the founder and key
member of the most significant international institutions in the
world today including the U.N.,107 the IMF, the World Bank, the
104 See KEOHANE, supra note 98 (discussing the importance of institutions as a
means for reducing information asymmetries and uncertainty, while also helping
facilitate cooperation among states); Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The
Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L SEC. 39 (1995) (highlighting the
importance of institutions as channels for achieving the benefits of sustained
cooperation).
105 See Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational
Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 762 (2001) (describing
international institutions’ range of features as “the result of rational, purposive
interactions among states and other international actors to solve specific
problems”); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992) (suggesting that state
interests in anarchy are not fixed and could be shaped by norms, ideas and intersubjective understandings).
106 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 448 (2000) (“[S]trong states must typically make the
substantive content of legalized arrangements (just) attractive enough to
encourage broad participation at an acceptable cost.”).
107 Member States of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/
en/members/ (last visited May 1, 2013).
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), and the World
Trade Organization,108 among others. Given its prominence in
world affairs, the United States has been able to design the
international institution with its interests in mind, making the
institutions more accountable to its wishes. This Section provides
examples of some of these ex ante tools in the operation of the U.N.,
the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. It is not, by any means, a
comprehensive discussion of all the mechanisms that the United
States has at its disposal to monitor international institutions. It
also does not touch upon every single international entity to which
the United States has delegated either binding or non-binding
authority.
Attenuated Delegation. For many international institutions, the
United States has created “majority rule” decision-making
processes on some issues, while reserving the most important
issues to smaller entities within the institution. In essence, the
United States has delegated general authority to the international
institution, and, within the institution, it has ensured that specific
authority has been delegated to or nested in a smaller sub-group
that exercises true decision-making authority. For example, the
U.N. has some 192 members and each has a vote in the U.N.
General Assembly. But, for the most important issues regarding
the “maintenance of international peace and security,”109 the U.N.
is structured such that the U.N. General Assembly, in effect,
delegates decision-making authority to the U.N. Security Council
(“Security Council”).110 The Security Council has only fifteen
members at any given time, five of which are permanent and
possess a veto: the United States, France, Great Britain, China and
Russia.111 With the veto power, the United States can block any
potential Security Council resolution that conflicts with U.S.
interests or those of its allies. For the key security issues of
international politics, the 192 members of the United Nations do
108 See Press Brief, World Trade Org., Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral
Trading System (Dec., 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/the
wto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm (last visited May 1, 2013) (listing the
United States as a founding member of the GATT).
109 U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
110 Id. arts. 10–12 (describing the functions and powers of the General
Assembly).
111 Id. arts. 23, 27 (defining the composition of the Security Council).
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not have the bulk of the influence; it is really an institution of five.
The agency costs, such as they are, will likely be reduced in this
structure. The World Bank and the IMF also have smaller
subgroups that exercise true decision-making authority. Though
the World Bank has 187 member states,112 the real power remains
with the twenty-five person executive board, five of which are
nominated by the United States, Germany, France, Japan and the
United Kingdom, and with the President of the World Bank, who
has always been an American.113 The IMF also has 187 member
states, but real power for major decisions is lodged with the
twenty-four directors on the executive board, with five of the
directors representing the same five countries listed above.114 Even
this superficial overview of the decision-making structure of the
IMF and the World Bank suggests that the United States has
structured both institutions to try to ensure American control and,
as a consequence, reduce agency costs. Just as in the domestic
context, the United States has tools to monitor and oversee
international institutions.
Voting Rules. The United States’ outsize influence through
attenuated delegations in the U.N., the IMF, and WTO is
exacerbated by their voting rules. Most international institutions
are not democratic in their voting procedures and reflect a
disproportionate influence for the United States well beyond the
size of its population.115 For example, the United States has a veto
112 About Us: Member Countries, THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/
SGCDPJKLX0 (last updated Jan. 19, 2012).
113 About Us: Boards of Directors, THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/
LHHOT1LSW0 (last updated May 19, 2013); Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby,
World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence, 10 REV. OF
DEV. ECON. 224, 224 (2006) (noting the “traditional nomination of World Bank
Presidents by the US”).
114 Membership,
INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/
about/members.htm (last visited May 1, 2013); IMF Executive Directors and Voting
Power, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/
eds.aspx (May 1, 2013). See also MILES KAHLER, LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN THE
MAJOR MULTILATERALS, at viii (2001) (“For the [International Financial
Institutions], the United States and Europe have laid exclusive claims to
leadership positions since the formation of the institutions.”).
115 See Fleck & Kilby, supra note 113 (“The US is the most influential member
of the World Bank . . . .”); see also Axel Dreher & Nathan M. Jensen, Independent
Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International
Monetary Fund Conditions, 50 J.L. & ECON. 105, 106–07 (2007) (describing the United
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and permanent seat on the Security Council;116 though the United
States cannot force resolutions through the Security Council due to
the presence of other veto powers, it can prevent the Security
Council from acting contrary to U.S. interests. At the IMF, the
United States has a nearly seventeen percent weighted vote at an
institution that requires a consensus of eighty-five percent for
major decisions and amendments,117 and virtually the same
structure exists at the World Bank. In fact, the biggest criticism of
both the World Bank and the IMF is the effective veto that the
United States has over any major decisions.118 Studies in the
political science literature on the IMF and the World Bank find
that, overall, they have been effective agents for the interests of
their principal, the United States.119 If anything, these international
institutions are actually uniquely responsive to U.S. interests rather
than unaccountable to the American public.

States’ power within the IMF and its ability to veto any decision based on its
voting share).
116 U.N. Charter arts. 23 and 27.
117 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND (1944) (requiring an eighty-five percent majority vote for all
major decisions); IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of
Governors, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/mem
dir/members.aspx#U (last updated July 7, 2013) (listing quotas and voting shares
for the United States and other IMF Members).
118 See NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND
THEIR BORROWERS 27–28 (2006) (emphasizing the process of increasing influence
that the most powerful states, and the United States in particular, have exercised
on the IMF and the World Bank); Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney,
Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank
Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241, 242, 254–56 (2003) (describing the intense
influence that the United States can impose on the World Bank when Congress
and the President have converging policies).
119 See Dreher & Jensen, supra note 115 (describing the United States’
influence within the IMF); Fleck & Kilby, supra note 113 (describing the United
States as the most influential member of the World Bank); Thomas Oatley & Jason
Yackee, American Interests and IMF Lending, 41 INT’L POL. 415 (2004) (describing
how American policymakers influence the IMF to pursue their financial and
foreign policy objectives); Thomas Barnebeck et al., US Politics and World Bank
IDA-Lending, 42 J. DEV. STUD. 772 (2006) (concluding the United States exerted
significant influence on International Development Association lending during
the 1990s based on issues identified as important by the State Department).
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Though much of the literature on the WTO focuses on its
dispute resolution mechanism,120 the WTO’s consensus decisionmaking structure ensures that the developed countries, including
the United States, have disproportionate influence over outcomes.
Although each member state has a vote, virtually all decisions by
the WTO are taken by consensus, meaning “if no member present at
the meeting when the decision is formally taken, formally objects to
the proposed decisions.”121 As a consequence, the ability of the
WTO’s member states—and their respective delegates—to attend
and participate in meetings is of particular importance in shaping
the agenda, negotiations, and decision-making at the WTO.122
But, unsurprisingly, developing countries do not have the staff
or resources to follow and actively participate in the WTO’s
decision-making. Each year, the WTO General Council meets as
many as six times,123 discussing multiple issue areas ranging from
the effect of non-tariff measures on small economies to trade
finance reform. While the developed countries have the resources
to participate—the United States, Japan, and Germany, for
example, have forty-seven124 delegates working full time at the
WTO—some forty-five countries have fewer than three.125
120 See, e.g., Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:
Less Is More, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 416 (1996); Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute
Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EURO. J. INT’L L. 753 (2002); Marc L. Busch & Eric
Reinhardt, Three’s a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement, 68 WORLD
POL. 446 (2006).
121 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 50, art. IX, n.1 (emphasis added).
122 For example, the WTO has a small Secretariat, with approximately six
hundred official staff, that runs the day-to-day operations for the institution. See
The WTO: Secretariat and Budget: Overview of the WTO Secretariat, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm (last visited
May 1, 2013). This might seem large, but it is dwarfed by the World Bank’s ten
thousand official staff or even the IMF’s twenty-four hundred official staff. About
Us: People, THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/B6U4HPNDS0 (last
updated June 29, 2012); Staff of International Civil Servants, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/about/staff.htm (last visited May 1, 2013).
123 The WTO General Council is scheduled to meet six times in 2013. WTO
General Council, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
gcounc_e/gcounc_e.htm (last visited May 1, 2013).
124 Carolyn Deere, Changing the Power Balance at the WTO: Is the CapacityBuilding Agenda Helping 32 (United Nations Dev. Programme Human Dev. Report
Office Occasional Paper No. 2005/5, 2005), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/
reports/global/hdr2005/papers/HDR2005_Carolyn_Deere_5.pdf.
125 Id. at 32–34.
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Moreover, some of these delegates from developing countries are
not only tasked with responsibility at the WTO’s headquarters in
Geneva but also represent their respective states at the half dozen
other international institutions located in the city.126 In effect, it is
hard for developing countries to participate in the WTO’s decisionmaking structure, while easier for wealthier, developed countries
like the United States to influence outcomes. Again, the WTO
shrinks from an international institution with 153 member states to
one in which a small number of states exercises real power.127
Appointments. The United States also has influence over the
appointment and termination of top officials at many international
institutions.128 In agency-cost terms, the United States has tried to
ensure that agency heads are not too far removed from American
interests. One unobservable way in which the United States
influences international institutions is by shaping the decisionmaking of other states. If a state knows that the United States is
likely to look unfavorably on a potential nominee, that state will be
less willing to nominate the person in the first place. U.S.
preferences frame the breadth of decision-making options for other
states. But there are observable factors as well. The United States
single-handedly blocked the re-appointment of Boutros BoutrosGhali as U.N. Secretary General in 1996,129 by exercising its veto
power on the Security Council despite losing the Security Council
vote 1-14.130 In casting this vote, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright stated that the United States was dissatisfied with his
Id. at 10.
Of course, many might question this analysis given the difficulties that the
United States and other developed countries have had in moving forward on the
Doha Round of negotiations. But the argument in this Article is that the United
States can influence the operation of international institutions to ensure that they
will not act contrary to U.S. interests, while still allowing the United States to
pursue its own initiatives.
128 See Robert Hunter Wade, Hegemony and the World Bank: The Fight over
People and Ideas, 9 REV. INT’L POL. ECO. 201, 217–18 (2002) (describing how the
United States used its influence over the composition of World Bank leadership);
cf. KAHLER, supra note 114.
129 Security Council Unanimously Chooses Annan as New Leader, THE NEWS (Boca
Raton), Dec. 14, 1996, http://news.google.co.uk/newspapers? id=rDRUAAAAIB
AJ&sjid=nY4DAAAAIBAJ&pg=5835%2C3781302; U.S. Blocks Re-Appointment of
Boutros-Ghali as U.N. Secretary-General; Kofi Annan Elected as Successor, 8 FOREIGN
POL’Y BULL. 104 (Feb. 1, 1997).
130 Security Council Unanimously Chooses Annan as New Leader, supra note 129.
126
127
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leadership and wanted a new direction at the U.N., regardless of
the level of his support in the international community.131 When
the Security Council authorizes the use of force, the United States
also insists that all American troops acting on behalf of the U.N.
only serve under an American commander, even though the
United States is formally acting under U.N. auspices.132 At the
World Bank, the United States not only has an effective veto power
over major decisions but also unilaterally names the President of
the World Bank,133 inevitably an American who will likely shape
the direction of the international institution to pursue U.S.
interests.
Even this simple discussion of four of the world’s most
prominent international institutions demonstrates that the United
States implemented many ex ante tools to try to ensure that the
international institutions to which it has delegated non-binding
authority remain effective agents for their principal—the United
States. But this is not the limit of the United States’ capacity to
influence international institutions and reduce agency costs; just as
within the domestic delegations context, the United States has
several ex post tools as well.
4.2. Ex Post Oversight Tools for International Delegations
The United States’ predominance in international politics also
allows it to use a set of ex post tools that are conceptually similar to
those available in the domestic context. They range from funding
international institutions, side payments to states, and conditions
on foreign aid, to provisional participation, withdrawal, and the
131 Discussing the United States’ veto on Boutros-Ghali’s reelection,
Madeleine Albright stated “[w]e believe that the United Nations needs new
leadership for the 21st century, somebody whos [sic] going to get up every
morning and decide that reforming the U.N. so that it can function in the 21st
century is his or her major goal.”
U.S. Poised to Veto Boutros-Ghali,
CNNINTERACTIVE (Nov. 17, 1996, 10:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/
9611/17/ghali/.
132 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 10161, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S
POLICY ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS (1994), available at
http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc1.
html (noting that while the President “will never relinquish command of U.S.
forces,” he retains the authority to place forces under operational control of a
foreign commander).
133 Fleck & Kilby, supra note 113.
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creation of new international institutions. While these ex post tools
might be more costly for the United States—withdrawal from an
international institution or the creation of a new one is not easy—
they are available to the United States, and on occasion it has
utilized them. But, if the United States’ participation in any
international institution is key for that institution’s efficacy, the
very availability of these tools and the prospect of their use also
shape the operation of international institutions and keeps them
generally aligned with U.S. interests. The United States does not
have to exercise its power in order to influence state behavior.
Funding.134 Perhaps most obvious, just like Congress can
threaten or formally limit the agency budget, designate the funding
for specific purposes, and condition increases on the achievement
of certain goals, the United States can do similarly with some
international institutions.135 This tool is uniquely available to the
United States because it is often the single biggest financial
supporter of international institutions.136 The United States is the
largest contributor to the IMF and World Bank,137 and it
contributes almost twenty-two percent of the U.N.’s operating
134 Ian A. Bowles & Cyril F. Komos, Environmental Reform at the World Bank:
The Role of the U.S. Congress, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 777, 782 (1995) (noting that in the
context of multilateral development banks, “Congress is free to determine the
amount of funding it provides for any given program, to set conditions for
disbursement or even to earmark part of its contribution”).
135 The Clinton administration, for instance, conditioned World Bank funding
on specific reforms, including the creation of an inspection panel and the
restructuring of the World Bank’s Global Environment Facility. Ian A. Bowles &
Cyril F. Komos, The American Campaign for Environmental Reforms at the World
Bank, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 211, 220 (1999). The United States has also
withheld contributions from the Inter-American Development Bank until the
institution required all borrowers to stop discriminating against procurement bids
from potential suppliers in the United States and other countries. JONATHAN E.
SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20791, MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS:
PROCEDURES FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION 3 (2001).
136 In 2011, the United States contributed more than $580 million, or twentytwo percent of the U.N. budget. U.N. Secretariat, Assessment of Member States’
Contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget for the Year 2011, U.N. Doc.
ST/ADM/SER.B/824 (Dec. 28, 2010). Although the United States does not
contribute money to the IMF every year, it remains the largest contributor to the
IMF with a SDR quota of 42,122.4 million or more than seventeen percent of the
Fund’s total. JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20413, IMF AND
WORLD BANK: U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS AND AGENCY BUDGETS 1 (1999); IMF Members’
Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, supra note 117.
137 SANFORD, supra note 136.
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budget. In fact, in the 1990s, the United States successfully
conditioned payment of its outstanding dues to the U.N. on
changes to the U.N.’s institutional structure to address corruption
concerns and to increase transparency.138 Further, when the
Security Council authorizes a use of force, it relies on the
contribution of the member states for enforcement.139 The United
States is by some distance the largest supplier of troops, funding,
and materiel to U.N. “coalition” forces. For example, when the
Security Council authorized the use of force to remove Iraqi troops
from Kuwait in 1991,140 the U.N. turned to the United States and
other countries for support. Unsurprisingly, the United States led
the coalition and contributed the vast majority of troops and
materiel to the effort.141 Even during the recent Security Councilsanctioned campaign in Libya,142 the United States had to supply
the bulk of munitions and intelligence because France and other
countries were running out of resources.143
138 MARJORIE ANN BROWNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33611, UNITED NATIONS
SYSTEM FUNDING: CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES 43 (2011); Margaret P. Karns & Karen A.
Mingst, The United States as “Deadbeat”? U.S Policy and the UN Financial Crisis, in
MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT 267, 275
(Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman eds., 2002).
139 See Edward C. Luck, Tackling Terrorism, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL:
FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 85, 97 (David M. Malone ed., 2004)
(noting the U.N. Security Council’s “reliance on powerful member states for
military enforcement”); see, e.g., S.C. Res. 743, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (Feb. 21, 1992)
(authorizing the creation of the U.N. Protection Force).
140 S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing the use of
“all necessary means” against Iraq beginning January 16, 1991, and requesting the
States to provide support).
141 The United States contributed more than five hundred thousand troops
against Iraq during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm—more than four
times the amount of the next nation. The United States also provided more than
three thousand tanks and planes. Daniel S. Papp, The Gulf War Coalition: The
Politics and Economics of a Most Unusual Alliance, in THE EAGLE IN THE DESERT:
LOOKING BACK ON U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 21, 22 (William
Head & Earl H. Tilford, Jr. eds., 1996).
142 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing the use
of “all necessary means” to protect Libyan civilians and serving as the basis for
military intervention).
143 See Borzou Daragahi & Brian Bennett, Libya Bombing Campaign Targets
Kadafi’s Air, Ground Forces, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011, http://articles.latimes.
com/2011/mar/21/world/la-fg-libya-fighting-20110321 (“One problem the
administration faces is that even though Obama wants the U.S. to play a
supporting role in Libya—and, indeed, the first strike came from a French fighter
jet—only the United States has the resources to launch the complex operations to
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Side Payments and Foreign Aid.144 Similarly, the United States
uses side-payments and attaches conditions on foreign aid to
influence (or lobby) states to support U.S. initiatives both within
and outside of international institutions. We can imagine the
United States using economic influence—some observable, some
unobservable—to secure support for U.S. initiatives within
international institutions or circumvent them. At the U.N., after it
became clear that the Security Council would not provide a
resolution authorizing the use of force for the Second Gulf War,
President George W. Bush created a “coalition of the willing”145
that included states which received cash or in-kind payments in
exchange for supporting the United States.146 When the United
clear Kadafi’s air defenses.”); James Kirkup et al., Libya: US Urged to Return to
Front Line, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Apr. 13, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8449063/Libya-US-urged-to-return-tofront-line.html (reporting on France’s suggestion that the United States should
deploy its resources in the Libya operations again); Meera Selva & Danica Kirka,
Europe’s Libya Campaign Comes Under Scrutiny, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 14,
2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/jun/14/europes-libya-campaigncomes-under-scrutiny/ (reporting that France and Britain have been struggling
with a lack of munitions and equipment).
144 Side payments have long been used as a means of procuring cooperation
with U.S. international policy goals. In 1911, the United States made side
payments to both Great Britain and Japan to seal the 1911 North Pacific Fur Seal
Treaty. SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 34 (2003). More recently, the United States
supplied North Korea with fuel oil and constructed two light-water reactors for
North Korea’s continued participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Alan Riding, U.S. and North Korea Sign Pact to End Nuclear Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/22/world/us-and-north-koreasign-pact-to-end-nuclear-dispute.html. Cf. Royal C. Gardner, Exporting American
Values: Tenth Amendment Principles and International Environmental Assistance, 22
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 34 (1998) (discussing the incentives provided to China and
India to accede to the Montreal Protocol including a provision creating a fund for
grants and concessional loans to developing nations to enable their compliance).
145 Hamada Zahawi, Comment, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake
of Operation Iraqi “Freedom,” 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2295, 2296 (2007) (“On March 19,
2003 President George W. Bush proclaimed, ‘My fellow citizens, at this hour,
American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to
disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.’ With
those words the United States and its ‘Coalition of the Willing’ launched
Operation Iraqi Freedom.”) (footnotes omitted).
146 Laura McClure, Coalition of the Billing—Or Unwilling?, SALON (Mar. 12,
2003, 7:43 PM), http://www.salon.com/2003/03/12/foreign_aid/ (reporting the
use of payments to build a coalition of approximately 40 nations to back the Iraq
war effort).
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States expressed concern that the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) might gain custody over Americans abroad, the United
States conditioned the receipt of foreign aid to some countries on
their willingness to refuse to turn over Americans to the ICC.147
Moreover, since the United States has a substantial role in
determining which states receive World Bank loans and IMF
support, the United States has encouraged the attachment of many
conditions on aid, forcing the recipients—who often cannot access
private capital markets—to liberalize their economies, to cut the
public sector, and to pass austerity packages.148 Many have
criticized the conditions attached to aid as the United States
imposing its policy preferences under duress.149 The takeaway is
that the United States has tools to influence the product of
international institutions by shaping the preferences of the member
states.
Create New Institutions. Another tool that the United States has
used to maintain influence over international institutions is simply
creating a new institution when, for whatever reason, the old
institution has been ineffective or unresponsive to U.S. interests.
For example, in the negotiations to form the WTO, the United
States and other large economic powers withdrew from the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) and forced the
developing countries to either join the new WTO in a single
undertaking or remain outside the new international trade
system.150 The United States and others forced the developing
147 See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31495, U.S. POLICY
REGARDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 17 (2006) (describing the U.S.
laws prohibiting Economic Support Funds from being paid to any party to the
ICC that has not agreed to protect U.S. citizens from being turned over to the
ICC); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI L.
REV. 83 (2003).
148 See Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1921, 1939–49 (“With the IMF able to walk away from the table without
injury, while a country on the other side of the talks faces ruin, it is not surprising
that countries in debt typically agree to IMF conditionalities.”). Scheppele notes
the typical conditions included monetary discipline, fiscal discipline, and
privatization of state property.
Id. at 1940 (citing JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 55 (2002)).
149 See Dreher & Jensen, supra note 115 (surveying criticisms of the IMF as an
“agent of U.S. foreign policy”).
150 See Richard L. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002). Judith H.
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countries to join on their terms or lose access to the world’s largest
economic markets. Of course, creating a new institution is costly
and requires participation from other states with similar interests,
but it remains available depending on the degree to which the old
international institution deviates from U.S. interests.
Withdrawal. The United States can refuse to join international
institutions, withdraw, or only provisionally participate in
international institutions that have acted or are likely to act
consistently against U.S. interests. For example, the United States
refused to join the League of Nations in the early-twentieth
century, likely condemning it to failure at its inception. More
recently, the United States signed but eventually indicated its
intent not to become a party to the Rome Statute creating the
International Criminal Court.151 Since the United States was
particularly concerned with the ICC’s potential to create liability
for both parties and non-parties to the treaty, the United States
simply passed domestic legislation152 and signed Article 98
Agreements with states parties to the ICC to ensure that Americans
would not fall under its jurisdiction.153
In 2005, after the
International Court of Justice decision in Avena, the United States
withdrew from the Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations,154 which provided that the ICJ would have

Goldstein and Richard L. Steinberg also show that WTO judicial law-making
matters only when powerful states adhere to judicial decisions and that
compliance with liberalization decisions is in the U.S. interest. See Goldstein &
Steinberg, supra note 81, at 257.
151 Statement of Bill Clinton, President of the United States, Authorizing the
U.S. Signing of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Dec. 31,
2000, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/USClintonSigning31Dec00.
pdf (stating the U.S. signature on the Rome Statute is necessary to influence the
evolution of the court, but that he will not submit the treaty to the Senate until
U.S. concerns are addressed).
152 See ELSEA, supra note 147.
153 Id.
154 Adam Liptak, The U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body, N.Y.
TIMES, March 10, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/politics/10death.
html. According to then-State Department spokeswoman, Darla Jordan, the
reason for withdrawal was to protect the United States “against future
International Court of Justice judgment that might similarly interfere in ways [the
United States] did not anticipate when [it] joined the optional protocol.” Id.
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jurisdiction for claims under the Convention.155 Even earlier, in
1984, the United States withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ during the Nicaragua case156 and refused to participate in
the ICJ’s proceedings.
Though the discussion does not cover all the mechanisms
available to the United States, it demonstrates that the United
States has substantial tools to affect the conduct of international
institutions by influencing the organization’s procedural rules, the
composition of the rule-making body, and the agenda of the
relevant decision-makers. The United States can engage in both
intra-institution and inter-institution logrolling, shift decisionmaking authority across multiple organizational bodies,157 or
create narrow or issue-specific organizations158 to make
organizations more responsive to U.S. interests. Agency costs exist
in both domestic and international delegations but, given the
United States’ oversight mechanisms, those costs might not differ
significantly.
4.3. Acts and Omissions of International Institutions
By now it is clear that the United States has ex ante and ex post
mechanisms to influence the operations of international
institutions and ensure that they remain accountable to American
interests.
Depending on the structure of the international
institution, the relevant issue, and the interests of the other states,
the United States will likely choose the mechanism that is most
likely to generate the preferred outcome. For reasons related to the
United States’ power advantage, the United States has a broader

155 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, art
1, Apr. 18, 1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 241.
156 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 392, 398 (Nov. 26); see
also John Quigley, The United States’ Withdrawal from International Court of Justice
Jurisdiction in Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
263, 290–91 (2009).
157 Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 596 (2007)
(noting “the increased proliferation of international regulatory institutions with
overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries”).
158 See id. at 597.
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set of tools to shape the final work product of the international
institution.
But the United States’ asymmetric power advantage does not
mean that it can influence international institutions in all
situations; rather, the United States can stop initiatives that it does
not like, but it cannot always push through institutional objectives
that it prefers. For example, the United States’ veto on the Security
Council means the United States can stop the Security Council
from acting contrary to U.S. interests, but it doesn’t mean that the
United States can always force the U.N. to act consistently with
U.S. preferences. Of course, the United States has other tools to
encourage other states to align themselves with U.S. preferences—
some of those tools were outlined above—but the United States
cannot guarantee that the international institution will always act
in certain way. On balance, the United States can often get what it
wants out of an international institution, and can almost always
block initiatives that it dislikes.
Why is this important? The dynamic described above suggests
that the international institutions have a status-quo bias, one that
favors the state or states that have designed, funded, and retained
operational control of international institutions—in most instances,
the United States. Since the international institutions generally
cannot act without U.S. consent, they cannot hurt the United States;
in principal-agent terms, the agent cannot act without the
principal’s approval.
The key point is that there is no
accountability issue with international institutions since the United
States can block the initiatives it opposes and generally push
through those that it supports. Thus, the acts and omissions of
international institutions are unlikely to generate the kind of
agency costs that warrant a formal limit on international
delegations.
4.4. The Future of International Delegations
Finally, the argument outlined here focuses on the United
States’ asymmetric power advantage in creating international
institutions and ensuring some operational control through ex ante
and ex post mechanisms. But the United States will not maintain
this power forever, and, sooner or later, its influence over
international institutions will begin to wane. Does this potential
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eventuality support the critics’ contention that delegations create
high agency costs?
The answer to this question requires consideration of the
international political environment in which the United States
operates.
If the United States is the dominant power in
international politics, the mechanisms outlined above will allow
the United States to maintain effective control over international
institutions, sharply reducing agency costs and accountability
issues. This suggests that, at least while the United States is
dominant, international delegations to international institutions do
not present serious problems. However, if the United States is only
one of two or three dominant countries in the world (with China,
Brazil, and Germany rising), then the United States’ ability to
control the international institution diminishes, creating greater
accountability concerns. In such an international environment,
international delegations become more problematic and they will
likely present more significant principal-agent concerns. Thus, the
ability of the United States to influence international institutions—
and the wisdom of international delegations—is a function of the
level of constraint on the United States.159
Even in a world in which the United States is no longer
dominant, it is unclear why limits on international delegations are
necessary when Congress and the President will be able to assess
the United States’ ability to influence an international institution
before delegating decision-making authority. Congress and the
President are well placed to analyze the costs and benefits of a
specific delegation to an international institution, and, given the
possibility that the international institution might make decisions
inconsistent with U.S. interests, Congress and the President will
likely be sensitive to the consequences of international delegations
for the American people. In other words, Congress and the
President are already fully incentivized to internalize the costs of
international delegations and to ensure that the international
institutions with delegated authority are accountable to U.S.
interests.

159 For a discussion of the role of international constraints on the President’s
foreign affairs authority, see Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign
Affairs Law, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2013).
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CONCLUSION

This Article’s central claim is that similar accountability issues
are present in both domestic and international delegations, and
that a similar range of oversight tools is available to the United
States. If agency costs are comparable, we can better assess
arguments in favor of creating supermajority requirements,
requiring a clear statement rule, or endorsing additional political
branch authorization for international delegations.
These arguments rest on the mistaken presumption that agency
costs are high in the international delegations, and, as a result, ex
ante constraints are necessary to ensure accountability. But, as this
Article has demonstrated, such constraints are unnecessary. In
fact, given the steps that the United States has taken to ensure the
accountability in non-binding international delegations, it is likely
that Congress and the President are already cognizant of the
potential costs and benefits of international delegations when they
provide their joint consent through the Article II process for
treaties or through the Article I general law-making procedures for
congressional-executive agreements. It is unlikely that the political
branches would need a clear statement requirement or a default of
non-self-execution to force them to internalize the costs of
delegating binding authority to an international institution; the
political branches are well aware of the costs and benefits of
international delegations. Congress and the President’s use of
reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”) in the
treaty context, for example, demonstrate that awareness. Again,
given the United States’ role in the conception, design, and
operation of many of the world’s most important international
organizations, it is hard to imagine the United States delegating
binding authority to an international institution that would act
consistently against American interests or impose net costs on the
United States.
International delegations are in many ways substantially
similar to domestic delegations. They both generate agency costs,
and, in each context, the United States, acting through Congress
and the President, has similar oversight mechanisms to reduce
them. The specific agency costs in any single international
delegations are likely to rest on myriad context-sensitive factors
that make a general assessment difficult. But what is clear is that
proposals in support of limits on binding international delegations
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require greater clarity on the measures of agency costs, the efficacy
of oversight mechanisms, and the assumptions about the operation
of international institutions. Given the prominence of international
governance in the American political discourse, Congress and the
President are fully incentivized to consider carefully the wisdom of
both binding and non-binding international delegations; national
constitutional design limits are unnecessary.
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